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IN THE SUPREiME COURT
of the
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Appellants and Plainiijfs, ~.
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-vs..
-·.··JUANITA c·. SMITH, individually, ~nd ! : < ··;, l. :': r,:~, c- '~ ·: t, ,.J.,
JUANITA C. SMITH, Guardian· of the
. Estate of DENNIS SMITH, a minor,
. JOSEPHINE SMITH VODA, RACHAEL
· SMITH JENSEN, JOHN DOE and
:.: RICHARD ROE, and all p.e:r sons unknown
. claiming any right, title, estate or interest
in and to the real property subject of this
·-. -action,
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Respondents and Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

CLYDE & MECHAM
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
Attorneys for Appellants
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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IN 'THE SUPRE;ME COURT
of the

STATE. OF UTAH
ELLEN SMITH MOODY, and CHARLES
MOODY, her husband,
Appellants and Plaintiffs,
-vs.JUANITA C. SMITH, individually, and
JUANITA C. SMITH, Guardian of the
Estate of DENNIS SMITH, a minor,
JOSEPHINE SMITH VODA, RACHAEL
Sl\tiiTH JENSEN, JOHN DOE and
RICHARD ROE, and all persons unknown
claiming any right, title, estate or interest
in and to the real property subject of this
action,
Respondents and Defendants.

Case No.

2100

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Ellen Smith Moody, the owner of an
undivided one-fifth ( 1/5) interest in the David Smi~th
Sheep Ranch, brought this action as a partition proceeding against the other owners of the remaining fourfifths ( 4/5) interests in said ranch, seeking to have her
one-fifth share separated and decreed to her pursuant
to the provisions of the U~tah Code Annotated relating
io partitions. The Respondents, Josephine Smith Voda
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and Rachel Smith Jensen, having entered into contracts
to sell their respective interests to the defendants, Juanita
Smith, individually, and Juanita Smith, as guardian for
Dennis Smith, filed their Answers or disclaimers (R.
41, 43), indicating no affirmative defenses and further
relying upon the determination of the court as to their
respective interests. For this reason, these two defendants have not participated ,actively in the case.
Defendant, Juanita Smith, individually and as said
guardian, filed a Counter-Claim, setting up an alleged
contract between the plaintiff and said defendants, and
claiming that the plaintiff could not partition the property because she 'vas already bound to convey the property to said defendants by said contract (R. 21).
Trial was had on the is.sues of whether or not such
a contract did exist, and that question being resolved
in favor of the defendant, no further proc-eedings by way
of partition were had (R. 99).
Plaintiff's l\fotion for New Trial \Yas denied December 10, 1957, (R. 120) and this appeal is taken.
ST.A_TE~IENT

OF FACTS

Ellen S. )loody 'Ya.s the O\\"'ller of an undivided onefifth (1/5) interest in the David Sn1ith Sheep Ranch
situated in ,,.,.asatrh and Duchesne Counties (R. 69, 7).
TIH~re ''"erP four other brotl1ers and sisters of EllenS.
~I oody O\\Tning thP other undiYided one-fifth (1/5) interP~h": .J o~Pph, Jo~PphiiH\ 1\.arhel and David Sn1ith. These
l'ivP ehilur()n r(\e()ived their interests in part \Vhen their
fathPr djpd and in part hy later c.onyeyanee by their
1not her, .:\lieP (ireen"Tood Sn1ith of her do,Yer interest.
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David had acquired the intere.st of Joseph by a prior
transaction so that for all practical purposes, David was
the owner of two-fifths (2/5) interest at about the time
that the events pertinent to this matter transpired.
David Smith, a£ter the death of his father and after
his mother became incompetent to take care of the
sheep ranch, undertook the management of the ranch.
Ellen Moody assumed the care of he1r mother, Alice
Greenwood Smith, for the several years prior to her
n1other's death in 1953.
After considerable negotiations, conveyances and the
writing of various documents, most of which the Appellant was precluded from presenting at the trial except
by way of proffer of proof, a Lease Agreement was
executed between the Appellant and David G. Smith,
Lessee, predecessor of the Respondents, Juanita Smith
and Dennis Smith. The lease is marked as Exhibit "1".
Attached to the lease is a document designated as a
"Contract of Sale." The trial court upheld Respondents'
contention that the "Contract of Sale" bound the Appellant to sell the property covered by the Le.ase Agreement within such time as the lease provided and under
the terms of said alleged contract.
Appellant attempted to show that the various negotiations leading up to, and continuing after the execution of the lease precluded the existence of any intent to
execute the contract (R. 228, 235, Exs. "A" & "B") (R.
240-253, Exs. C, D, E, F & G) R. 255-261, Ex. H). By the
san1e record .and exhibits, Appellant tried to show that
the "Contract of Sale" wa:s impossible to perform. This
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evidence was not admitted and is shown as a p·roffer of
proof.

STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AND FINDING
THAT APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS HAD EXECUTED AN OPTION WITH A CONTRACT TO PUECHASE.

A.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND HOLDING
THAT THE ALLEGED OPTION AND CONTRACT WAS ON
ITS FACE IMPOSSIBLE OF PERFORMANCE, AMBIGUOUS AND THUS NOT ENFORCEABLE.

B.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ADlVIITTING THE TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH SMITH, ELLEN SMITH MOODY AND
CHARLES MOODY TOGETHER WITH EXHIBITS "A,'' "B,"
"C," "D," "E,'' AND "G," TO SHOW THE ALLEGED OPTION
AND CONTRACT WAS NOT IN FACT EXECUTED.

c.
THE COURT ERRED IN l\IAKING AND ENTERING
FINDINGS OF FA·CT NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12 AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NOS. 1, 2 and 3, AS NOT BEING
SUPPORTED BY THE ADl\IISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
_A_Rt1l~l\IEXT

I.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AND FINDING
THAT APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS HAD EXECUTED AN OPTION "'"ITH A CONTRACT TO PURCHASE.
rl,hi~

ae.t ion renters around the question of "~hether
or not thP docun1Pn t n1arked as Exhibit Hl ~~ is a binding
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opti1on requiring Ellen Smith Moody to convey her onefifth (1/5) interest in the ranch to the Respondents,
Smith, according to the terms of said Exhibit. The
Exhibit was introduced by Re~spondents over the objection o.f the Appellant (R. 199) (Ex. 1), Appellants
contending that said document on its face was nothing
1nore than a lease. Appellants contend further that
neither on the evidence introduced by Respondents and
admitted by the court, on evidence introduced by Appellants and admitted by the court, nor on evidence introduced by Appellants and not admitted by the court can
the decision be upheld .a s a matter of fact or of law.
This gener-al proposition is discussed under the following
points:

A.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND HOLDING
THAT THE ALLEGED OPTION AND CONTRACT WAS ON
ITS FACE IMPOSSIBLE OF PERFORMANfCE, AMBIGUOUS AND THUS NOT ENFORCEABLE.

The Lease is dated December 1, 1950 (Ex. 1), and
attached to the Lease is what is designated as a "Contract
of Sale" and is described as Exhibit "1 ". In considering
the impossibility of performing the alleged option and
contract, we should consider first of all the various dates
\\rhich were set forth in said attached "Contract of Sale":
(See Exhibit 1)

1. The "Contract" 1n its paragraph 1, indicates a
date of execution of J.anuary l, 1950, nearly one year
prior to the execution date of the Lease.
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· 2. The date of posses'Sion in paragraph 2 of the
''C,ontract'' is also stated a.s being January 1, 1950.
3. The dates upon which the payments under the
contract are to be made ·are shown in paragraph 2 of
the "Contract" as commencing on November 1, 1951 and
falling on successive dates of November 1 each year
thereafter.
4. In paragraph 3 of the "Contract," the date of
delivery of an abstract is established 8$ July 1, 1951,
and the requirement of the certification date on the
abstract date is set at June 1, 1951.
5. The date of delivery of various documents and
deeds under paragraph 4 of the "Contract" is established
as February 15, 1951.
6. Paragraph 6 of the "Contract" requires payInent of all taxes after January 1, 1950.
7. The date of ackno\vledg:tnent is sho-wn as the
________ day of November, 1950.
It is manifest fro1n an exanrination of the above
dates that performance of the HContract ~~ "~as al"Tays
i1npossible fron1 the inception of the Lease, on December 1, 1950 and thence for"\\,.~ard .....\t no time could the
date of possession, the date of ackno,vledgement, the
date of exceution nor tl1e date of tl1e eoininenceinent of
the pay11tcnt of taxe.s been co1nplied "~ith.....\re "~e to say
that all of said dates n1ay be ignored as uni1nportant or
i11nnn.terial pnrts of the contract~ The ans\Yer is, of
courS(', obvious. Since these dates are ilnportant, \Yho
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now will establish these dates~ Will it be the court with
no evidence whatsoever before it by way of assistance
or will it be the parties by .a ~subsequent ~agreement~
The dates upon which payments are to be made, the
date of delivery of the abstract and the date of the
delivery of the escrow papers were all at least possible
of performance on December 1, 1950 when the Lease
was executed, but within one year they too bec.ame impossible of performance. Who now is to determine what
these dates shall be~ How can we now determine how
much time should be given to furnish an abstract of title,
or what the continuation date of the abstract should be~
If the abstracts are to be brought to date on some day
in 1958, there, of course, will be additional costs for
entries which may be of record since June 1, 1951, the
original date established in the "Contract." This, will
be an additional burden forced on the Appellants by an
arbitrary selection of date·s by the court or by .an entirely
new agreement between the parties. In either event,
we are adding to the "Contract" obligations not covered
under the original terms.
The terms of the alleged contract leave very material
matter.s entirely omitted or at least in a very ambiguous and uncertain status. No evidence was introduced by
the Respondents to indicate how the various dates were
to be handled. And, of course, under the objections made
by Respondents when Appellants attempted to explain
the uncertainties and ambiguities, Respondents could not
consistently have introduced any such evidence. The
only evidence available in any way to explain th i ~ "Con-
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tract" ·was offered by Appellants, but was rejected by
the court.
The arbitrary manner in which these various dates
could be designated is graphically evidenced in the judgment entered by the court. At paragraph 3, thereof (R.
105, 106), the court has inserted as the commencement
of payments under the alleged contract, the 5th day of
October, 1957, and has ordered that payments shall be
made commencing each year on the same date. What
is the basis for the court ordering payments to commence on October 5 ~ Certainly nothing in the record
gives the court any indication as to why this date should
be se~lected. Might the court not have established a much
later date, giving the Respondents additional benefits by
way of the use of the money until payment is actually
commenced~

The Court has not in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law or J udgn1ent indicated the date after which
the Respondents shall pay the taxes; the court has not
indicated the date upon which the abstract of title shall
be deter1nined ; the court has not indicated the date to
'vhich the abstract searcl1 shall be brought; the court
h.a~ not indicated the date upon "\Yhicl1 the various papers
and rlocun1ents are to be deliYered to esc.ro"\Y. Xeedless
to ~a~~, therP is no proyision ''"·hatsoeYer indicating the
1na.nnPr of perfor1naJ1ee of these Yarious phases of the
all('g·pd eon tract. a 1l of \Yhich giYes rise to further disput(\ interpretation and possible legal proceedings to
rix tlH'~P additional dates.
It

i~

11utni t\}~t, tht'r<:\fore, that the parties could not
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have intended to be bound by the do-cuments introduced
by Respondents as Exhibit "1" and relied upon by Respondents as the basis for the alleged contract. It is
fundamental under contract law that the contract must be
performable under irts terms.
Even if the parties had intended this document to
be an option and a contr.act, said contract would have
to fail because of uncertainty since it cannot be performed in the manner in which its terms attemp~t to provide.
The question resolves itself into whether or not the
absence of the various dates is of sufficient importance
to render the contract unenforceable because of their
absence. It is conceivable that perhaps one date in and
of itself under certain circumstances might not be of
such importance. IIowever, where, as in this case, the
entire contr,act and every phase of :its performance is
purportedly governed by dates, the taking away of those
dates does render the contract unenforceable. Therefore,
'vhen the Respondents had rested their case on the
Counter-Claim with only the· introduction of Exhibit "1' ',
the court should have dismissed the Counter-Claim and
proceeded to the matter of partition. The Respondents'
evidence had not shown any contract or option susceptible of performance \vhich would require the conveyance
of the interest of Ellen Smith Moody, thus preventing
her partition action.
In const1uing any alleged contract, the court must
give consideration to all parts of the contract and cannot ignore portions thereof in order to uphold the con-
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tract as a valid document p~articularly when the portions
ignored are material to the performance of the contract.
Thus in this case, the court cannot ignore the various
dates of p·erformance, precluding Appellants from testifying concerning the ambiguities and thereafter insert
provisions of its own choice. However, if there are ambiguities and uncertainties, the parties must be given
the opportunity of adducing evidence to show what was
intended by the p·arties to the contract. If the court
states and holds that the contract is valid and needs no
explanation, then the court cannot insert therein various
dernands governing its performance. Particularly the
court cannot insert a date of performance, as it has done,
in the Order requiring Appellants to specifically perform
the contract. If, however, the court cannot order perforinance of the contract because of uncertainties, then
it 'vould follo'v that evidence should be adduced to show
the intent of the parties. Burt rs. StringfeUow, -±5 l . . t.
207, 143 Pac. 234; Beagley z:s. r:. S. Gypsu;n Conzpany,
236 Pac. 2d 783; Ill atlz is vs. ~fads en, 1 Ut. 2d 46; Gates
l'S. Daines, 3 lTt. 95; .and B'ryaut rs. Deseret }... . eu·s, 233
Pac. 2d 335.
Further1nore, if there are unc.ertainties or ambiguitir~, these a1nbiguities n1ust be construed against the
dra\rer of tl1P doeu1nent. Bryant Y. Deseret ~Teu·s, sup'l"a.
The doeu1nent here 'vas dra\\11 by DaYid Sn1ith and his
attorne~·~, (),ren . ~
. '\7a.rd, and thus should be eonstrued

in

it~

it

i~

interpn)tation against the dra:\rers (R. 260).
In the consideration of the docun1ents themselYes,
nppnrent thnt they nre i1npos.sible of perfor1nance
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and ~as is stated in Yankton Sioux Tribe vs. United States,
272 U.S. 351, "the same rule undoubtedly is that where
there is -a legal impossibility of performance appearing
on the f.ace of the promise, there is no contract in respect
of it." See also Jones vs. U.S. 96 U.S. 24 and Hull vs.
Brandywine Fiber Products Company, 121 Fed. 2d 108.
The two documents, ie, the lease and the attached Contract of Sale, must be possible of performance, and cannot be inconsistent. If they do not meet these two requirements, they do not constitute an agreement between the
parties.
B.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH SMITH, ELLEN SMITH MOODY AND
CHARLES MOODY TOGETHER WITH EXHIBITS "A," "B,"
"C," "D," "E," AND "G," TO SHOW THE ALLEGED OPTION
AND CONTRACT WAS NOT IN FACT EXECUTED.

The Appellant attempted to introduce considerable
evidence to explain to the court why the document designated as "Contract of Sale" was attached to the Lease
and still was not intended to be a binding option and
contract. In other words, the Appellants did attempt to
explain why an incomplete, uncertain, impossible to perform and ambiguous document was attached to the executed lease. The Appellants had three witnesses, Joseph
Smith, Ellen Smith Moody and Charles 11oody and in
addition, Appellants introduced various documents. The
testimony and documents all would have shown that at
the time of the execution of the Lease, David Smith and
Appellant did not intend to bind the:mselves by the document attached to the Lease.
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The testimony of said witnesses and the said documents offered were all objeCJted to by Respondents and
the objections sustained upon two general grounds:
(.a) That the witnesses attempting to testify were
barred by Section 78-24-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amende,d, known as the "Dead Man's Statute"; and,

(b) That the evidence was an attempt to vary the
terms of a written contract or could not be admitted bec.ause the conversations and documents were merged in
the final contract.
In discussing the propriety of the court's ruling, let
us first look at the evidence which should have been before the court, but which was excluded.
The testimony of Joseph Smith, had it been admitted
by the court, would have shown that at the time the
Lease was executed by David Smith and the .A_ppellants,
the condition of the property as to the acreage involved
w.as uncertain because of a dispute \Yith the :\Ioon family
concerning the boundary bet,veen the Smith R.anch and
the ~loon property (R. :229, :230~ :231~ 232). This uncertainty \vas further eYideneed by an Exhibit "..:.'\.~', a
large 1nap sho,ving the acreage in dispute and showing
the d ifferenee bet,veen the actual desc.ription of the
prop(•rty and the de~eriptiou of the property in the allPgPd '•Contract of ~ale" .attnehed to the Lease. Exhibit
··A·~ nl~o "~a~ rejt\etf'd b~~ the court as innnaterial and as
an aU ('Inpt to vary the eontraet. The testin1ony of ~Irs.
l\Lood~· on direct ex~uninatiou by tl1e Respondents coneprning thP pa~~nu?nt of tnxt•s by her and the f.ailure
to pay tn.xPs b~r the RPspondents (R. 218, ~19~ 220, 221,
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222) and Exhibit "B," a Deed from Joseph Smith to
David Smith showed a discrepancy in the amount of
acreage conveyed by Joseph Smith to David Smith in the
original sale of Joseph Smith's intere.st to David Smith
(R. 232). The foregoing evidence showed that prior to
the execution of the Lease, nobody knew how much acreage and which portions of the described property were
actually included in the ranch .and thus covered b¥ the
alleged "Contract of Sale."
Ellen Smith ~Ioody would have testified that when
the Lease was executed and prior thereto, David Smith,
Ellen Smith Moody and Charles 1\foody had various conversations indicating that in the prior negotiations and
at the signing of the Lease, the parties had not intended
to consider the attached document as a binding contract
(R. 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242). Exhibit "C" was introduced as a copy of a le~tter received from David Smith's
attorneys, indicating that prior attempts at drawing up
documents had been attempted in this transaction (R.
242). Exhibit "D", a letter from Ellen Smith Moody
to D. Ray Owen, dated October 1, 1950, prior to the execution of the Lease, indica ted the return of a proposed
"Contract of Sale," further demonstrating the uncertainty and the unsuccessful attempts to arrive .at an
agreement between the parties (R. 245). Likewise, Exhibit "E" and "F" are letters regarding the transaeti.on
showing further the attempts at reaching an agreement.
Exhibit "G" is another letter indicating th.at the pnrchase price had not been determined even as late as December 27, 1951, after the execution of the Lease.
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Charles Moody testified that he had no interest in
the property at all and had never had any interest in
the p-roperty (R. 254). Mr. Moody would have testified
that in the conversations with Mr. Smith, the "Contract
of Sale" was never agreed to for various reasons, as are
set forth in the record (R. 256). In connection with Mr.
Moody's testimony, Exhibits "G" and "H" were offered
Exhibit "H" being admitted and Exhibit "G" being excluded. These t-vvo letters indicate that even after the
signing of the Lease, there still was no agreement as to
the purchase of the land. Exhibit "H" is very clear in this
regard and indicates that the contract before being signed
must take into account the variou.s obligations owing from
D.avid to Ellen Moody. These exhibits again indicate the
lack of agrement between the parties and the lack of
intent to agree to the te-rms of the alleged Contract of
Sale.
Mr. Moody not being an owner of the property and
1nerely signing the lease agreement as a matter of convenience had no interest in the property, in the outcome
of the partition action nor the dealings with the
property other than that arising from his relationship
as husband to Ellen Smith Moody (R. 260).
In vie'v of the evidence " . hich 'vould have been adduced by the Appellants, it is eontended herein that such
Pvidenee, \Yould have conclusiv-ely .sho'vn the absence of
any agree1nent to consider the alleged Contract of Sale
as binding on the parties. This evidence "~ould have exl)lainPd the lack of eoncern of the p.a.rties as to the various
uncertainties eaused by the inco1nplete agreen1ent.
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This evidence would show that pnor to and even
after the execution of the Lease, there was uncertainty
in the minds of David Smith and Appellants as to the
acreage to be covered by the agreement to thereafter
be executed. The evidence would further show that the
parties had not agreed upon a price inasmuch as various
obligations arising out of the conduct of the Smith Ranch
and the support, care and maintenance of Alice G. Smith
had still not been determined between the parties. The
evidence further would show that the agreement .and
negotiations were not conclusively consummated, inasmuch as commencing prior to the execution of the Lease
and continuing on to December 1, 1950 and thereafter,
the negotiations continued and then merely closed upon
the death of David Smith.
We must, therefore, move to a consideration of the
two principles of law relied upon by Respondents and
the Court in sustaining Respondents' objections to the
introduction of Appell,ants' evidence.
WITNESSES' ALLEGED DISABILITY TO TESTIFY
UNDER THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
Look first at the te.stimony of Joseph Smith. Mr.
Smith testified without contradiction that he had no
interest whatsoever in the law suit or in the property
subject of the law suit (R. 229). Our statute provides
that the witness to be prevented from testifying must
be a party to the action or must be directly interested
in the event thereof, which interest must be adverse to
those of the guardian, administrator or other grantee
of the deceased person. The witness, if so disabled, can-
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not testify to matters of fact equally within the knowledge of said witness and the deceased person. None
of the requirements of the statute are evident as to
Joseph Smith and thus his testimony and he as a witness
are not disqualified by said statute.
The statute is hereinafter set forth:
Title 78-24-2, Utah Code

An1~otated:

"The following persons cannot be witnesses:
( 3) A party to any civil action, suit or proceeding and any person directly interested in the
event thereof, and any person from, through or
under whom such party or interested person derived his interest or title or any part thereof,
\vhen the adverse pa1iy in such action, suit or
proceeding claims or opposes, sues or defends,
as guardian of an insane or incompetent person,
or as the executor or administrator, heir, legatee
or devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian,
assignee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such
heir. legatee or devisee, as to any statement by.
or transaction "~ith. such dee-eased, in5ane or incoinpetent person, or n1atter of fact 'Yhate\er,
"Thieh n1ust haYe been equally within the knowledge of both the "~itness and such insane, inconlpetent or deceased person. unless such witness is
called to testify thereto by such adYerse party so
elai1ning or opposing. suing or defending, in such
aetion, suit or proceeding.'~
TlH"\rc i~ no doubt 'vhntsoeYer tl1at Joseph Snrith
had long since conye~~l"\d a'vny a:ny interest he had in
tliP ranelt propert~-. This i~ sho,vn by the Stipulation
(lonct\rni11g the fee title to the property (R.. 7, 69).

' 7"i th

referL~nce

to the testiinony of Ellen Sn1ith
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~Ioody,

Appellants contend that she is not disqualified
under said statute for the following reasons. The very
document upon which Respondents predicate their
Counter-Claim w.as identified by Mrs. Moody, and by
stipulation the document was introduced, showing her
signature. Mrs. Moody was called as a witness by the
Respondents and interrogated concerning the payment
of taxes on the property subject of the law suit. This
obligation arises out of the document in question and
involves a portion of the land covered by the alleged
'"Contract". All of this necessarily involves an interpretation of the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
It should be pointed out also that :L\Irs. 1loody's deposition was taken by Respondents in this case, although it
was not published. The Respondents having called Mrs.
~Ioody to testify concerning the transaction and particularly the payment of the taxes under the alleged documents, having introduced the document with her signature attached, thereby waived any disability to which
she might have been subject under the above mentioned
statute. At 64 A.L.R. 1157, there are numerous cases
annotated indicating that when a document is introduced
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the docuInent can be testified to by the adve,r.se party. The cases
therein cited are: Hoes vs. Nagele, 51 N.Y. Supp. 233;
Hopkins vs. Clark, 35 N.Y. Hupp. 360; Watson vs. Dodson,
121 S.W. 209 (Tex); Robertson vs. O'Neill (Wash.) 120
Pac. 885.

In the case of Clayton vs. Ogden State Bank, 82
Ut. 564, the court in holding that the mere taking of a
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deposition does not constitute waiver of the disqualification said, however:
"The question of competency is one to be dete,rmined by the court at the tlln.e the evidence is
offered and then it is not a question of waiver,
but one as to whether 'such witness be called to
testify ...... by such adverse party.'"
The Court thus indicated that if the witness is called
the waiver is effected and it is not the testimony to
which the witness will testify that is material in determining whether or not the disqualification has been waived.
The case of Burk vs. Peter, 115 Ut. 58, involved the
question of whether or not in an action on a Promissory
Note, the administratrix by offering the note in evidence
had waived the disqualification of the defendant to testify concerning the transaction surrounding the execution
of said note. The Court said :
"However, the waiver of incompetency totestify is limited to the matters, facts or transactions
proved by the introduction of endenee by the
representative or by "~itnesses called on behalf of
the estate and does not extend to all transactions
\Vi thin the issues of tl1e case as contended by Appellant. See Carter 1·s. Curlezr Creanzery Con~
pauy. 16 ,~~ash. 2d 47G, 134 Pac. 2d 66, on page
7:3 of the Pacific. Report "~herein tl1at court said:
'1 t n1a~~ be conceded that ~\ppellant ( representat i YP of a deeedent) did introduce certain testilllOn~· relatiYe to transactions and conversations
"·i th the deePased and as to those transactions first
dPveloped hy ..:\ppellant the benefit of the statute
"·ns "~aiYt)d and Respondents had the right to
introdue.P evidence relatiYe to those transactions
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and all other circumstances necessary to explain
them. But although the statute may have been
waived as to those particular transactions opened
up by Appellant, the waiver does not extend to unrelated transactions and conversations. Croft vs.
Security State Bank, 54 S.D. 325, 223 N.W. 208;
Wilkins vs. Skoglund, 127 Neb. 589, 256 N.W. 31;
Nolty's Adm'r. vs. Fultz, 261 Ky. 516, 88 S.W.
2d 35.'"
It should be noted that Justice Latimer in his concurring opinion states:
''While I believe the restrictions imposed by
the statute can be waived by the protected party,
I do not believe the waiver should be extended
beyond the scope of the matter brought into issue."
The Respondents by introducing the Lease Agreement and the alleged contract immediately put into issue
the validity of that ·contract and the question of whether
or not the alleged contract had actually been executed.
As we have pointed out heretofore, the document in and
of itself is uncertain in its content and is susceptible
of explanation by the evidence concerning surrounding
circumstances. In other words, the matters attempted to
be shown by Appellants are not excluded as a matter of
evidentrary rule and thus might properly be made the
subject of testimony of this witness. The very issue raised
by the pleadings and by the introduction of Exhibit "1"
1nust be gone into by the Appellants, otherwise there is
no issue whatsoever. The Inatters atte1npted to be coveTed by the testimony of Ellen Smith Moody go to the very
essence of whether or not the document introduced w.as
executed. This is not an unrelated matter and is certainly
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part of a transaction opened up by Resp~ondents by the
introduction of Exhibit "1", by the testimony of Juanita
Smith and by the calling as a witness of Mrs. Moody
herself.
With reference to the qualification of Charles Moody
as a witness, Appellants contend that by reason of his
disinterest in the real property he is qualified to testify
concerning the trans~action involving the execution of
the alleged contract. Charles Moody is not the owner of
any interest in the property and never has been, as is
indicated in the Stipulation (R. 69, 254).
The Courts hold that a husband is competent to
testify and the mere fact that he would ultimately receive property by inheritance from his 'vife did not give
him ~an intere:st adverse· to the estate. See 58 A1n. Jur.
195 and the case of Mower vs. Mower, 64 Ut. 260.
Therefore, in view of the above authorities, Appellants contend that each of the witnesses and the e\idence
which they identified should have been admitted as
competent evidence and that the disqualification pro,ided
under the '~Dead ~Ian's Statute" should not appl~T to these
witnesses. Even were we to exclude the verbal testimony
of the three witne:sses, certainly the letteTs are not subject to the san1e possible disqualification as are the conversations of the "~itnesses . ..._~s has been indicated, the
purpose of the statute is to protert the deceased person
.again.st untrue state1nents not rapable of verification.
The letters, of course, speak for the1nselves and eould
not be subjeet to variation.
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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TO SHOW
THE NONEXISTENCE OF THE
ALLEGED CONTRACT OF SALE
The court sustained objections of the Respondents to
much of the testimony and evidence introduced by Appellants on the grounds that the alleged Contract of Sale
was the final contract and that under the Statute of
Frauds .and under the Parol Evidence Rule, no evidence
could be introduced to vary the· terms of the alleged
contract. Appellants have pointed out heretofore that
the alleged contract on its face was impossible of performance and that, therefore, there was no contract. Thus
the alleged contract could not he subject of the court's
order ·of specific performance. The point herein presented by Appellants goes to the admissibility of evidence tending to show that the contract was never in
existence as such.
The question of parol evidence and the varying of
a \Vritten contract conte·mplates an agreement which the
parties recognize was in effect, that is, an integrated
agreement. Appellants recognize the rule that ordinarily
parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of an
integrated agreement. This general rule, of course, is
subject to the exceptions wherein the agreement is ambiguous or uncertain and thus warrants explanation of
some kind. The cases cited in support of that rule have
been included heretofore.
The primary rule, however, relied upon by Appellants is that evidence can be introduced to show that an
agreement although written out and apparently on its
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f~ace

fully executed, w.as in fact never intended to be
executed. In support of this rule., the best statement and
holding can be found in the case of Sams vs. Feldman,
68 N.W. 2d 780 (Mich. 1955). This case involved a contract for the sale of real property and a preceding oral
agreement or statement to the effect that the property
was to be sold to another party. The court held that
the prior oral agreements would be admissible to sho"'
that the written contract was never intended to take
effect. The court stated:
"In the situation presented the question goes
to the very existence of the contract itself and this
is true whether the contract is or is not required to
be in writing under the Statute of Frauds. The
taking of parol on this issue neither varies nor
contradicts the writing but goes rather to the coinmencement of the obligation. Anomalous it would
be if the existence of a contract 'vere to bar parol
in a situation in which the very issue is whether
or not there is any contract in existence. The
courts, accordingly freely hear parol in such cases
as w.as pointed out in the \V.hite Showers Ine.
case, supra. Nor is the taking of parol exc-lusive of
contracts required to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds. "[Tpon theory, the arguments that
such contracts should follo"\Y a different rule does
not commend itself to us. The reasons for the
rule are of equal validity as applied to contracts
required to be in "\Yriting under the Statute of
Fraud.s. Accordingly, parol was held as to a condition precedent in a land eontract case in this
state in Rothstein vs.
eeks, 224 Mieh. 548, 195
N.W. 49. For similar holdings in land contract
cases in other jurisdictions, see . .\.lien vs. ~Iarciano, 79 R,.I. 98, SJ At. 2d 4:25 : Dependa.built

''T
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Homes, Inc. vs. Hiaettel, 81 Ohio App. 422, 76
N.E. 2d 616; B.all vs. Wright, 118 Colo. 410, 195
Pac. 2d 739; Restatement c·ontracts, para. 241.n
The case of Ball vs. Wright, 195 Pac. 2d, 739 (Colo.
1948), involved a similar situation wherein oral statements were admitted to show that a written contract was
not to be binding. The court said:
"The defense of no contract because requisite
conditions to its effectiveness a~e not complied
with, and oral proof of such conditions, is not
unknown to the law nor the rule applicable thereto
in doubt. 'The rule excluding parol evidence has
no place in .any inquiry unless the court have before it some ascertained paper beyond question
binding and of full effect. Hence parol evidence
is permi.ssible to show conditions precedent which
relate to the delivery or taking effect of the instrument . . . for this is not oral contradiction or
variation of the written instrument but goes to
the very existence of the contract and tends to
show that no valid and effective contract ever
existed . . . . ' 32 C.J.S. Evidence, Para. 935, p.
857 : Rothstein vs. Weeks, 224 lvfich. 548, 195
N.W. 49, 51."
See also following the sa1ne rule these cases : Burenlzeide v. L. F. Wall, (1955) Colo. 281 Pac. 2d 1000; Stock
vs. il1eek, 221 Pac. 2d 15 (Cal. 1950); O.J.R. vs. Dwights
Estate, 205 Fed. 2d 298 (1953) Cert. Denied 346 U.S.
871, \vherein Augustus l-.J. Hand stated: "Facts recited
in an integrated agreement may, of course, be shown
to be untrue even by the parties themselves. Restatement
Contracts, Para. 244."; Pet Milk Oorttpany vs. Boland,
175 Fed. 2d 151, C. C. A. (Missouri); Union Oil Oon~pany
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of California vs. Union Sugar Company, 173 Pac. 2d 700
(Cal.); LaCava vs. Breedlove, 174Pac. 2d 880; Bowen vs .
.Z~e-rdinger, 92 N.Y. Supp. 566 N.Y.; Sme.low vs. Dickerson, 54 Atl. 2d 883 (Penn.)
In 3 Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, para.
634., it is stated:
"The parol evidence rule does not become
applicable unless there is an integration of the
agreement of contract, that is, unless the parties
have assented to a certain writing or writing as
the statement of the agreement or contract between them. Accordingly, it may be shown by parol
evidence not only that a writing was never executed or delivered as a contract or that the validity of the agreement was impaired by . . . .
mistake . . . and that the parties .agreed by parol
that the writing in question should not become
effective until some future day .... "
Certainly in view of the rule upheld by the authorities above, Appellants should have been able to introduce
evidence to show that the alleged Contract of Sale \Y~s
never intended to have been executed. It is not a question
of v.arying the written contract as n1uch as it is a question
of determining that the contract \Yas not intended to
be a contract. Certainly the testnnony of the three \Yitnesses, together 'Yith the docmnents identified and introduced indicate that the parties could not have intended
to bind themselves by the alleged "Contract of Sale.'' It
should be pointed out that no evidence 'YhatsoeYer was
jntroduced by Respondents to indicate that the contract
was intended to be executed, other than the docu1nent
itself. l\fatters concerning the contract price, area to be
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conveyed, .and questions of delivery of the Warranty
Deeds were all shown by the documents and testimony to
be left undecided as a matter of agreement. Should Appellants be foreclosed from introducing this evidence to
show that the agreement was never consummated~ We
think not.

c.
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING
FINDINGS OF FACT NOS. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12 AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NOS. 1, 2 and 3, AS NOT BEING
SUPPORTED BY THE ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.

This point has been previously covered under the
discussion of Points A and B, and need only be briefly
alluded to at this point in the brief.
The only evidence adduced by the Respondents in
support of their Counter-Claim is the incomplete and
impossible to perform Lease and "Contract of Sale",
marked ~s Exhibit "1". The very documents are impossible of performance by their terms and the Respondents have failed to produce any evidence upon "\Vhich the
court could possibly determine that the contract is valid
and susceptible of specific performance.
It is well accepted that a contract to be specifically
performed must be definite and certain in its material
terms. In the case of Otis Oil & Gas Corporation vs.
1l1aier, 284 Pac. 2d 653, the court s.aid:
"The court will not make a contract for the
parties. The contract made by then1 must generally be enforced, if enforced at all, according to
its terms . . . . . Thus it is said in 49 Am. Jur.,
Para. 171, P. 194: 'In rendering a decree of spe-
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cific performance, the court has no power to decree performance in any other manner than according to the agreement of the parties. The court
should not assume to make a new contract for the
partie:s and then decree its sp·ecific performance,
or undertake to compel the defendant to do something he did not contract or agree to do, but
should enforce the contract in question according
to its terms or not at all.' "
In the case of Owens vs. Wilson, 273 Pac. 895, 897,
the court held that where the contract did not provide
for a definite commencing date for the oil drilling, no
specific performance would be allowed. The court said:
"An agreement to make a contract in the
future is, of course, no contract at all because the
minds of the parties have not met upon tlE~
terms.''
In the case of Bonk vs. Boyajian, 274 Pac. 2d 948,
the court in denying specific performance stated:
"Where in a business transaetion an important item is reserved for future determination, no
enforceable obligation is thereby created for
'neither law nor equity provides a remedy for
breach of an agreen1ent to agree in the future.·
.... In the Ablett case, 43 C.al. 2d ---------------------------272 Pac. 2d, 276, the court points out ·an option
agreement which lea Yes an essential term to future
agreement is not enforceable.' The court 1nay not
i.Inply or speculate upon what the parties "'..ill
agree. . . . . Staten1:ent of the rule and the reason
therefore is to be found in 1 TT1 illiston. Contracts,
(1936) Sec. 45, p·.131 ..... '~
See also Crouch vs. Bischoff, 2SO Pae. 2d 419 .and Bruggeman vs. Soll.'ol_. 2()5 Pac. ~d 575.
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Certainly there is no foundation in fact or in law
for the trial court to have ordered specific performance
of the alleged contract when as a matter of fact and of
law there w.as no enforcible agreement between the
partie:s. The court eould only require performance by
inserting into the contract its own terms. The court did
insert its own terms, but still did not insert enough provisions to make the contract ·complete by any means.
~1any elements of the contract are still not definite
enough for performance.
SUMMARY
The instrument, Exhibit "1", on its face could not
at the time of execution of the Lease in December, 1950,
and cannot now be performed. Respondents had the
burden of proof of showing .a eontract which was definite, which had been -exeeuted, and which could be performed under specific performance. The Respondents
failed in every respect in establishing such a contract.
The instrument upon which Re:spondents base their
entire case would have to be explained in order to demonstrate why such a document would have been attached
to the Lease Agree1nent. The only logical and .actual
explanation was attempted by Appellants by offering
evidence and testimony to show that the original parties
had never intended to execute n1ore than the 1nere Lease
Agreement, vvithout further negotiations. All of this evidence was excluded by the court. Had the evidence been
ad1nitted .as it properly should have, the evidence would
have been conclusive that there never was a complete
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and integr-ated Lease and Option to Purchase suseeptible
nf specific performance.
Appellants respectfully request that the case be re·manded to the District Court for re-trial and that the
evidence proffered by the Appellants be admitted and
considered by the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE & MECHAl\I
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
Attorneys for Appellants
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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